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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
appraisal rights for transactions not specifically mentioned by
statute. The case-law emphasis in other jurisdictions has been con-
cerned with broad interpretations of legislative intent; however, the
real problem is that the form of the transaction has been made the
controlling factor while the pertinent question of whether there
should be appraisal rights at all has been overlooked. The granting
of this remedy compels a loss of mobility to the corporation40 and
reduces the speed and effectiveness with which the corporation can
make decisions. It is expensive 47 and uncertain, as the corporation
never knows how many dissenters to expect. The resulting flow of
cash away from the corporation may frighten creditors and cause
reorganization plans to be cancelled.4s These may well be adequate
reasons for refusing appraisal rights in all situations, but deciding
whether or not they are to be granted on the basis of the form of the
transaction alone does not meet the problem squarely. Certainly
such a rule enables a corporation to-avoid granting appraisal rights
simply by adopting a certain form for the transaction, but even the
severest critics of appraisal rights admit their utility in "no market"
situations49 which are often found when dealing with closely held
corporations. To grant relief in such situations and still preserve a
maximum of corporate freedom, granting the remedy should depend
on the effect of the transactions, rather than their form, and this
would involve a thorough revamping of the appraisal statutes.
WALTER RAND, III
Corporations-Unlawful Proxy Solicitation Under Securities
Exchange Act-Rights of Shareholders-Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts to Grant Retrospective Relief
Under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
it is unlawful to solicit proxies in violation of the Securities Ex-
" See Note, 59 COL. L. Rav. 366, 368 (1959).
'
7 In Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 431 n.5, 143 A.2d 25, 28
n.5 (1958), it was conceded that the reorganization plan would fail if ap-
praisal rights were given, due to the expense involved.
8 For a good discussion of "the company's perspective" see Manning,
supra note 7, at 233-39.
"Id. at 260-62.
S"It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce... or otherwise to solicit
or permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy...in respect of any se-
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change Commission's rules promulgated thereunder.2 The proxy
rules apply to securities listed and registered on a national exchange.'
The Commission is empowered to enforce the provisions of the act by
seeking a federal district court injunction against further violations.4
Recently the courts have been faced with deciding whether a right
enforceable in the courts is created in private parties (as opposed
to the Commission) by section 14(a). Broadly speaking, there are
two questions to be considered in connection with this problem:
(1) Does a private right of action exist for injuries suffered or
threatened from a violation of section 14(a), and if so, who may
assert it, and (2) who has the power to grant relief to a party
injured by such a violation?
In three recent decisions, it has been expressly held that a right
of action is created in an individual stockholder by a violation of
section 14(a) and the Commission's proxy rules, notwithstanding
the fact that the act does not expressly provide for such.5 Such a
right of action is based on "the general rule that a breach of statutory
duty normally gives rise to a right of action on behalf of the in-
curity (other than an exempted security) registered on any national securi-
ties exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors." 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1958).
2 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -11 (Supp. 1963).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (Supp. 1963).
'SEcuRiTrEs EXCHANGE, Acr §21(e), 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958). Although the Commission is merely empowered
to seek an injunction against further violations of the act, the courts will go
beyond this and enjoin the use of the proxies illegally solicited as equity will
not allow the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing. SEC v. May, 134 F.
Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956); Central
Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y.), modified sub norn.,
SEC v. Central Foundry Co., 167 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
SBorak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 32
U.S.L. WEEK 3173 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1963) (No. 402); Dann v. Studebaker-
Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Walsh & Levine v. Peoria &
E. Ry., 222 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (dismissed for failure to join in-
dispensable parties). Before these decisions, there had been dicta both to the
effect that there was a right of action and to the effect there was not. As-
suming its existence, Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Contra, Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 790
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
It does not seem that all of the Commission's proxy rules would support
a private action, especially after the vote had been taken. Some of the rules
are of administrative importance only. See SEC Reg. 14a-6(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(a) (Supp. 1963), which requires. that copies of any proxy ma-
terial be furnished to the Commission ten days in advance of solicitation.
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jured persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted."' Spe-
cifically, section 14(a) has been interpreted to give the stockholder
the "right to a full and fair disclosure of all material facts which
affect corporate elections by proxy,"17 and to place the proxy solicitor
under a duty to provide such disclosure by obeying the proxy rules.'
This duty is owed the stockholder because the purpose of section
14(a) is to protect the voting rights of stockholders.0 To enforce
this right, the stockholder has a personal right of action.'0
The second problem, the one confronting the courts today, is
whether the federal courts possess the power to give relief to a
stockholder injured by a violation of section 14(a) who subsequently
brings a suit on the theory outlined above. There seems to be no
doubt that an adverse party is entitled to "prospective relief," i.e.,
injunction against the use of proxies obtained in violation of section
14(a)." However, whether corporate elections or action authorized
' Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., supra note 5, at 208-09. Accord,
Walsh & Levine v. Peoria & E. Ry., supra note 5, at 519. See RESTATEMENT,
TORTS, § 286 (1934). In so holding, the courts reject the maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another), which might have been applicable be-
cause Congress expressly provided for civil remedies under three sections
of the act: § 9(e), 48 Stat. 889.(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1958) (manipula-
tion of prices); § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1958)(recovery of "insider" profits); § 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. 78r (1958) (reliance on misleading statements in material filed pur-
suant to the act when buying or selling). This is in accord with the up-
holding of private rights of action under other sections of the act where not
expressly provided for. E.g., Hlooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp.,
282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (implying
a right of action for violation of § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
78j(b) (1958), and SEC Reg. lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 [1949]).
'Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 848 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. granted,
32 U.S.L. WEEK 3173 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1963) (No. 402).
' See Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 208 (6th Cir.
1961).
'Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., supra note 8 at 207-08.
"
0It has been held that there is no right of action when the damage to
the stockholder is of a derivative nature. Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp.
507 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
937 (1957). This decision has been criticized heavily. See 2 Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 950-51 (2d ed. 1961); 70 HARv. L. REv. 1493 (1957). While
this limits the right of action, it is in accordance with the statute which is
aimed at the protection of the personal right of the stockholder to cast his
vote knowing all the facts. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d
201, 207-08 (6th Cir. 1961).
" See note 4 supra, regarding courts enjoining the use of illegally so-
licited proxies even though not expressly authorized to do so when the Com-
mission is plaintiff. In Central Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429
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by illegally solicited proxies may be set aside or damages awarded
if recision should prove inequitable is less clear. The cases have
split on the question of the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
grant "retrospective relief" for such violations.
12
In Borak v. J. I. Case Co.,'13 the plaintiff stockholder brought a
class action on behalf of himself and all other stockholders similarly
situated against the defendant corporation, its officers, and directors
in a federal district court. Plaintiff alleged that a merger and a stock
option plan were approved at a special stockholder's meeting by
the use of proxies solicited in violation of section 14(a). Plaintiff
also alleged that the agreements were void contracts under the pro-
visions of section 29(b) of the act' because they were made pur-
suant to a violation of sec. 14(a). He asked that the merger be de-
clared void and that damages and such other relief as equity might
(S.D.N.Y.), modified sub nor., SEC v. Central Foundry Co., 167 F. Supp.
821 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), both director-stockholders and the Commission were
plaintiffs. The court declared the proxies void and adjourned the meeting
until another solicitation with adequate facts could be held. Dann v. Stude-
baker-Packard Corp. also recognized jurisdiction to grant this "prospective"
relief. 288 F.2d at 214.
12 Holding there is jurisdiction to grant "retrospective" relief: Borak v.
J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 32 U.S.L. WEBic
3173 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1963) (No. 402) ; Walsh & Levine v. Peoria & E. Ry., 222
F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Holding that federal jurisdiction is limited to
"prospective" relief: Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th
Cir. 1961).
" Supra note 12.
" "Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter...
and every contract... the performance of which involves the violation of,
or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of, any provision
of this chapter ... shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who,
in violation of any such provision... shall have made or engaged in the
performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any
person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right
thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making
or performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision. ...
48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1958).
An alternative theory for upholding the plaintiff's right of action may be
found here. The proxy is treated as a contract and its solicitation in viola-
tion of § 14(a) makes it void. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 15-16, Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963); Comment,
Private Rights and Remedies under the S.E.C. Proxy Rudes, 3 B.C. IND. &
Com. L. Rnv. 58, 59 (1961). It has been held that under the general rule
implying a right of action from the statute, the plaintiff does not have to
show that he was even solicited. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288
F.2d 201, 209 (6th Cir. 1961). Here however, plaintiff might have to show
that he was solicited and gave his proxy in order to have standing to sue
as a party to the contract.
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see fit be granted. The district court held that the federal court's
jurisdiction to grant relief is limited to a declaratory judgment as
to the validity or invalidity of the proxies once they had been voted1
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court,
and held that section 27 of the act'6 confers jurisdiction upon the
federal courts to award damages or to grant discretionary equitable
relief, although retrospective, as the merits of the case require.'7
In so holding, the court analyzed Dann v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp.,' on which the district court relied, and concluded that the
Dann court had taken a mistaken view of the jurisdictional grant of
section 27.'" In Dann, plaintiff stockholder asked that Studebaker-
Packard be returned to the economic position it held prior to the
consummation of certain "arrangements" between Studebaker-
Packard and another corporation, if the court, discounting void
proxies solicited in violation of section 14(a), found that the two-
thirds majority vote necessary under Michigan law for approval of
the transaction was wanting. Plaintiff alleged that jurisdiction was
conferred upon the federal courts to grant such relief by section 27
of the act20 and section 1331 of the Judicial Code.2' The Dann court
adopted the view that the ultimate decisions involved in the case,
i.e., what were the consequent effects of the validity or invalidity of
the proxies, were so strictly questions of state corporation law that,
in the absence of a clear mandate to do so by Congress, the federal
courts should not assume jurisdiction to decide them. 2 Gully v.
1 317 F.2d at 841.
"6 "The district courts of the United States... shall have exclusive juris-
diction of violations of this chapter ... and of all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the
rules and regulations thereunder.. . .Any suit or action to enforce any lia-
bility or duty created by this chapter... or to enjoin any violation of such
chapter... may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the
defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process
... may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an in-
habitant or wherever the defendant may be found." 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958).
1 317 F.2d at 849.
" 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
'o 317 F.2d at 848-49.
,o See note 16 supra.
" "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy... arises under the ... laws... of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. 1331 (1958).22 288 F.2d at 214.
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First Nat'l Bank23 was cited as the basis for the court's decision to
end federal jurisdiction with the voting of the proxies. Gully stands
for the proposition that "to arise under the laws of the United
States" so as to give the federal courts jurisdiction, the federal
right must be the primary right asserted and not merely a collateral
one. The federal right which plaintiff sought to assert in Dann was
found to be "really negligible in comparison" to the state questions
which would have to be decided. 4 Thus, even though the federal
right asserted by the plaintiff "would probably be material to the
ultimate outcome"25 it was merely collateral to the primary ques-
tion, the validity of a corporate vote, which arose under state law.26
Borak, in disagreeing, pointed out that the "jurisdictional facts"
in these cases were totally different from those in Gully." In Gully,
it was held that there was no case "arising under the laws of the
United States," and consequently, no federal jurisdiction, where the
right plaintiff sought to assert (collection of a tax) was actually
given by a state statute and the only connection that could be shown
with federal law was that a federal statute allowed the states to pass
such statutes.2 s However, in the principal case and Dann, a right
given by the federal statute was directly violated and it was the viola-
tion of his federal right that the plaintiff asserted as the basis for
redress. For this reason, the Gully decision is not applicable to
Borak.2" Rather, the court viewed the doctrine set forth in Bell v.
Hood3" as the better reasoning. As the court somewhat loosely stated
that doctrine: "[F] ederal courts have the power, under a general
grant of jurisdiction to enforce a federal statute, to grant all of the
relief.., commensurate with the effective enforcement of the statute,
and the protection of rights created thereby .... "a As section 14(a)
created a right to "full and fair disclosure," the jurisdiction given
the courts by section 27 is large enough in scope under this doctrine
to encompass damages or other retrospective relief as might be
23299 U.S. 109 (1936).
2'288 F.2d at 214.
25 Ibid.
26 Id. at 215.
27317 F.2d at 848.
2 299 U.S. at 116.
'2 317 F.2d at 848.20327 U.S. 678 (1946).
21317 F.2d at 848.
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
necessary in the individual case to fully protect the right.8 2 Ample
support for this doctrine was found in the cases.8
If the Supreme Court crosses the first hurdle and upholds the
private right of action for a violation of section 14(a),84 it will be
faced with choosing between these views of the jurisdictional grant
of section 27. Because of the fact that section 27 provides for "ex-
clusive jurisdiction" in the federal district courts to enforce liabilities
or duties created by the act,', either result would have a definite
effect on the future rights of shareholders to enforce private rights
of action under the Securities Exchange Act.
Clearly it seems that the Gully case on which Dann relied is in-
applicable to this situation where there is a direct violation of a
federal statute. However, the problem raised by Dann, whether the
validity of the vote is a matter of state law or of federal law, is
critical. It results from the fact that the federal law regulating proxy
solicitation is "super-imposed" on the general body of state corpora-
tion law governing the validity of corporate votes and the conse-
quences of invalidity. 6 If we disregard the discredited reliance on
Gully,37 it would seem that the basis of the Dann court's decision
was that it could find no Congressional intent to create a right which
would involve determinations of what have traditionally been matters
of state law.3 The court seemed to think that deciding questions in
' Id. at 849.
"Although the remedy was not specifically provided for in the statutes
under which the following actions were brought, the Court held that it
could grant the relief necessary to accomplish full justice: Mitchell v. Robert
Demario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (authority to order defendant to
reimburse for wages lost through a violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., v. United States, 334 U.S. 110(1948) (power to order a violator of the Sherman Antitrust Act to divest
himself of holdings unlawfully acquired); Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S. 395 (1946) (traditional equity powers used to order restitution
of rents above the maximum allowed by the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942).
"It would seem that the Court will be constrained to uphold the private
right of action in view of the body of law which has grown up around SEC
Reg. lOb-5. The section of the act it is promulgated under, § 10(b), like§ 14(a), does not provide any private remedy for its violation. See note 6
sup ra.
"Supra note 16.
"See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 973.
"The Dann court's reliance on Gully is criticized in the following: Com-
ment, Private Rights and Remedies under the S.E.C, Proxy Rudes, 3 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REv., 58, 67 (1962); 75 HARv. L, REv. 637, 639 (1962).3 288 F.2d at 212, 214.
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these areas would be a judicial "federalizing" of state law, and this
it was not willing to do. So it ended federal jurisdiction with the
declaratory judgment even though realizing that such a decision
meant "eating away at the vital principle that for every federal right,
there should be a complete federal remedy." 9
Borak, on the other hand, took the position that the "federal-
izing" was done by Congress when it chose to enter the field with
such a strong program of requiring "full and fair disclosure" to in-
vestors in securities. The jurisdictional grant of section 27, ex-
tending as it does to all suits brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by the act, thereby encompasses the traditional power to
give a full federal remedy for the violation of a federal right.40 One
theory justifying this approach is that there is no question of "state
law" involved. Such a conclusion finds support in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills.41 In that case it was held that a mere grant
of jurisdiction to entertain suits arising out of violations of contracts
in the labor field gave rise to substantive law which was to be
fashioned by the courts out of the legislative policy embodied in the
national labor statutes.42 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ex-
presses a policy no less broad than that of the Taft-Hartley Act,4
and the fact that jurisdiction to hear suits arising out of violations of
the act is exclusively reposed in the federal courts is favorable evi-
dence of Congressional intent that the rights vindicated by suit
would be decided as federal law under the protective eye of its own
courts. Such a view is bolstered by holdings to the effect that in
areas where there is federal jurisdiction, but no federal law on a
specific question, state law may be adopted if compatible with the
federal aims.44 The adoption of state law surrounding the corporate
vote in determining whether plaintiff has been injured would be
"Id. at 214.
,G 317 F.2d at 849.
"353 U.S. 448 (1957).
12 Id. at 456.
"_A former Chairman of the Commission expressed the function of the
proxy rules and the policy behind them in this manner: "The proxy rules are
a vital part of the shareholders' 'Bundle of rights.' They afford a means by
which shareholders can exercise an informed judgment .... They implement
the fundamental concern of the Congress expressed in "the federal securities
laws for the public investor." Armstrong, Introduction to ARANOW & EIN-
HORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL at xxiii (1957).
"E.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln .Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957);
Board of Comm'rs, v. United States, 308 U.S. 343'(1939).
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highly desirable solution as it would favor various local policies
while redressing the violations of the federally created right.
From a practical standpoint, Borak seems to be the more desir-
able of the two decisions. If Dann is followed, the state courts could
still refuse to take jurisdiction by holding that in determining the
consequent effects of invalid proxies, they would be enforcing a lia-
bility created by the federal law, in contravention of the exclusive
jurisdiction provision of section 27.4r Furthermore, even if the state
courts did take jurisdiction to decide the "state law" aspects of the
action, two actions would be necessary before relief could be
granted. Besides the time and money lost in this litigation, plaintiff
would also lose the benefits of liberal venue and nationwide service
of process available under section 27.48
Moreover, Borak carries out the purpose of section 14(a), pro-
tecting investors in securities, to a much greater degree than Danm.
The very fact that the private action exists in addition to the en-
forcement by the Commission adds to the protection afforded by the
act .4  The decision also serves as a warning that any advantage
obtained through illegal solicitation may be taken away in a private
action after the vote. As such, it is a psychological weapon against
those who would make use of such methods.
ROBERT B. LONG, JR.
Liability of Continuing Shareholder for Constructive Dividend
When a closely held corporation redeems the shares of one
stockholder, the threat of a constructive dividend may present tax
problems for the continuing shareholder. The problem arises when
one major shareholder has decided to leave the corporation and an-
other wishes to remain. Basically, there are two ways for the con-
tinuing shareholder to acquire complete ownership of the corpora-
tion: (1) the continuing shareholder may use his personal funds to
' State courts have so far refused to hear any claim or defense based
upon § 14(a) because of § 27. E.g., Investments Associates, Inc. v. Standard
Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501 (Ch. 1946), aff'd, 29 Del.
Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23
N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 12 N.J. 467,
97 A.2d 437 (1953).
See these provisions of § 27 in note 16 supra.
"Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 21, Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317
F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963).
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